Introduced by Andreas Munk Holm, this EUVC Live at GoWest series spotlights the thought leadership of policymakers, institutional investors, GPs, corporates, and public capital leaders around one defining question:
How does Europe mobilize its own capital to secure its technological future?
Across the sessions, one theme emerges repeatedly:
Europe does not lack talent.
It does not lack innovation.
It does not lack savings.
It lacks coordination.
Corporate venture capital now represents ~25% of global VC volume.
And for many startups, the most likely acquirer is not another startup. It’s a corporate.
Yet despite its scale and strategic importance, the average lifetime of a corporate venture unit is only 3.7 years.
Why?
In this talk, our very own Jeppe Høier, Co-founder of EUVC Corporate, argues the issue is not capital, it’s a misunderstanding.
Most corporates launch venture arms believing they are “doing VC.” In reality, they are attempting to build a strategic instrument without the operating system required to sustain it.
Why CVCs Fail
CVC failure is remarkably predictable. Most units shut down after roughly three years due to a perceived lack of financial performance, or after around six years due to a perceived lack of strategic alignment. The timeline matters because it reveals the root problem.
In the early years, CVCs are judged like funds. Later, they are judged like corporate departments. They fail both tests because they were never designed to satisfy either. The core mistake is simple: corporates treat venture capital as a side project, not as a strategic tool.
Most shut down:
After ~3 years due to lack of financial performance
After ~6 years due to lack of strategic alignment
The timeline matters.
It reveals the root issue.
In the early years, CVCs are judged like funds.
Later, they are judged like corporate departments.
As one Stanford professor puts it: “A successful CVC survives three CEOs.” That is not a slogan. It is a governance requirement.
Venture Is a Different Species
Jeppe’s underlying point is that venture capital does not behave like corporate strategy. It behaves like a market. It is probabilistic, long-cycle, and power-law distributed. This is why so many corporate venture units collapse for the same reason: they attempt to run venture with corporate logic.
Which means most CVC units collapse for the same reason:
They attempt to run venture with corporate logic.
Annual planning cycles
Consensus decision-making
Brand risk aversion
Short-term ROI metrics
Internal politics
Venture cannot breathe in that environment.
The Three Pillars of a Durable CVC
Jeppe frames CVC success around three operational pillars: Build, Buy, and Partner. The model is simple, but it forces clarity in a space where most corporates default to ambiguity.
1. Build
A CVC must begin with purpose. Why does it exist? Is it designed for financial return, strategic access, ecosystem positioning, talent pipeline development, or M&A option value? Most CVCs fail because they never answer this question. They launch with vague intent, and governance collapses the moment pressure arrives. A CVC without a defined purpose becomes incoherent in portfolio construction, inconsistent in decision-making, and vulnerable to leadership changes.
2. Buy
If a corporate wants to invest, it must operate like a VC. That requires a clear investment committee structure, defined geography and stage focus, an explicit lead versus follow strategy, a transparent decision process, and consistent pacing with ownership targets. Jeppe’s point is uncomfortable but true: if you want to play in venture, you must speak the language of venture. Otherwise, you will be treated as a tourist and lose access to the best deals.
3. Partner
This is the differentiator.
Most corporates believe capital is the value. It isn’t. Capital is table stakes. The real value of a corporate investor is integration: customers, pilots, procurement pathways, distribution, manufacturing leverage, regulatory credibility, and commercial validation. But integration requires corporates to understand startup velocity. Startups move in weeks. Corporates move in quarters. Without a clear partnership model, the relationship degrades into frustration.
Most friction in VC–corporate relationships comes from one thing: governance opacity. Startups cannot navigate what they cannot predict. Clarity builds trust.
The Core Thesis
Corporate venturing is not financial tourism. It is not a branding exercise. And it is not a three-year experiment.
It is a strategic infrastructure.
If designed correctly, it becomes one of the most powerful instruments a corporation can deploy to stay technologically relevant, access frontier innovation early, build acquisition optionality, and shape ecosystems rather than react to them.
If designed poorly, it becomes a predictable story: a venture unit created under one CEO, questioned by the next, and shut down by the third.
